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Since its inception in 2001 and subsequent integration into the tri-national Great Limpopo Transfrontier
Park (GLTP), Mozambique’s Limpopo National Park (LNP) has been progressively transformed into a
functioning wildlife park. Standing behind this transformation has been a profound expansion of
Mozambican state power over and through the park. While this reinforces predictions in the early
transfrontier conservation literature, it stands in tension with observations that these projects threaten
state power. I address this tension by developing the concept of articulated sovereignty, which un-
derstands sovereignty as a heterogenous set of powers that are produced through often unequal in-
teractions with other actors, including foreign or extra-territorial actors. In short, sovereignty is
articulated through these interactions. I draw from this to show that the same partnerships that seem to
threaten sovereignty in some respects in fact shore up the power of the Mozambican state in other
respects. I focus in particular on the foreign-assistance-enabled extension of state power through the
development of legal and technical capacity, park administration and infrastructure, a ranger force, and
the relocation of communities beyond park borders. I additionally draw on articulated sovereignty to
show that the state and territory, like sovereignty, are built through various articulations with extra-
territorial partners, thus drawing into question the sovereignty-state-territory triad. I close by reﬂect-
ing on the utility of articulated sovereignty beyond the realm of conservation. In short, articulated
sovereignty sheds light on both the sovereignty complexities of transfrontier conservation projects like
the LNP/GLTP and how sovereignty actually plays out in the world.
 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license.In 2008, seven years after the opening of Mozambique’s Lim-
popo National Park (LNP), Vicente sat down to describe how the
park had been impacting his village of Massingir Velho, now
encompassed within park borders. He began by describing the
damage caused to the community’s farms by elephants, which had
only recently been reintroduced into the area. Translocated from
South Africa’s Kruger National Park, elephants and other large game
were brought in to restock the LNP given the ecological destruction
of the country’s “civil” war. The combined effect of the weakness
and policies of the postcolonial state, Apartheid South Africa’s
project of regional destabilization, and the larger geopolitical
context of the Cold War, from 1977 until 1992 Mozambique was
embroiled in a brutal conﬂict. It had left over a million people dead,52.
Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-SA destroyed state capacity at a harrowing level, and devastated much
of the country’s wildlife (Hatton, Couto, & Oglethorpe, 2001;
Lunstrum, 2009; Minter, 1994). In addition to helping rehabilitate
wildlife in the LNP, this reintroduction of elephants was a much-
celebrated event tied to the creation of the Great Limpopo Trans-
frontier Park (GLTP), which built in 2002, unites the LNP with
Kruger and Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou National Park into a
35,000 km2 mega-park (Fig. 1). After expressing his concerns over
the elephants, Vicente redirected his critique to the Mozambican
state. He strongly objected to the fact that killing wildlife, including
invading elephants, translated into ﬁnes or jail time and even
beatings by park police. And he should know. Vicente, himself, had
been beaten and arrested for killing an animal and for suspicion of
harboring an illegal ﬁrearm. Furthermore, the park administration
was planning on relocating villages like Massingir Velho beyond
park borders. Vicente uttered with more than a hint of resignation,
“[the park administration] said we should leave the park... We are
not going to stay here because this place has been sold.” His
experience made clear, especially set against the lack of national
state power in the aftermath of the war, that the state by means oflicense.
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at an unprecedented level. It had not only sold the land from
Vicente’s perspective, forcing the village to relocate. It had funda-
mentally rewritten the purpose of this space as it becomes a
functioning national park: more precisely, a protected home to
wildlife, a site of tourist consumption and economic development,
a key piece of the larger transfrontier park, and no longer a site of
village life.
In many ways, this extension of state power ﬁts into a well-
established pattern of state institutions securing control over a
space in the name of conservation and development. It also reﬂects
early predictions that transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) like
the GLTP would indeed consolidate state sovereignty over these
spaces. It nonetheless stands in tension with suggestions that
foreign or extra-territorial actors backing these projects have the
potential to threaten if not erode state sovereignty. In light of such
suggestions, how do we explain this apparent ﬁrming up of state
power? Put differently, how do we explain the tension in which
these initiatives seem to both strengthen and threaten state power?
More concretely, set against both the evisceration of the state
during the war and the undeniable inﬂuence of powerful extra-
territorial actors, how has the Mozambican state been able to
consolidate its power at such an unprecedented scale? More
broadly, what insight does such a case awash in sovereigntyFig. 1. Southern Africa’s Great Limpcomplexities shed on the very concept of sovereignty and how it
actually plays out in the world?
I address these questions by developing the concept of articu-
lated sovereignty. It shows that sovereignty, rather than an abstract
concept that a state clearly possesses or lacks, is better understood
as a set of attributes, competencies, and powers that are actively
and routinely produced through a series of unequal interactions
and negotiations with other actors, including other state and extra-
state actors. In other words, sovereignty is articulated through
these connections. What we see in practice is that the compe-
tencies or powers that do get articulated via these interactions are
multiple, contingent, have different targets and spatialities, can
potentially threaten one another, and may be gained by compro-
mising other powers. Such an understanding of sovereignty helps
us make sense of the complexity of the extension of Mozambican
power through the LNP/GLTP and particularly the tension in which
state power is seemingly both threatened and strengthened
through such projects. More speciﬁcally, articulated sovereignty
helps us grasp that the extra-territorial partnerships throughwhich
the park is created may simultaneously threaten sovereignty on
some registers, especially the ability to exclude foreign inﬂuence,
and shore up the power of theMozambican state on other registers,
including the power over territory, as well as populations, and ul-
timately the ability to (re)invent territory. By delving into theseopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP).
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rests not merely in transfrontier conservation or state practices
more broadly; it lies in the heart of the concept of sovereignty. We
also see that not only is sovereignty articulated through these
extra-territorial negotiations, so too are state and territory.
After drawing from the sovereignty debates to develop the
concept of articulated sovereignty, I explore the question of state
power in the transfrontier conservation literature, examining
seemingly contradictory claims that these projects threaten and
consolidate state control. Drawing on the concept of articulated
sovereignty, I then examine howMozambican state power over the
LNP is largely articulated through the very partnerships that are
thought to threaten it. I illustrate this through an examination of
the development of national institutional capacity, park infra-
structure, the creation of a ranger force, and the resettlement of
communities beyond park borders. Finally, I draw from this case to
reﬂect more broadly on the concept of sovereignty and the related
concepts of state and territory. In the process, I offer a glimpse into a
(trans)national park in the making.
Articulated sovereignty
Much of the mainstream international relations literature and
many popular understandings of sovereignty posit it as primarily a
legal concept, or de jure sovereignty, that refers to a state’s unlim-
ited and indivisible rule over its territory. A growing body of critical
scholarship has shown that de facto or effective sovereigntydthat
is, the actual ability to exercise powerdis far messier and less
containable than this juridical deﬁnition allows. By opening up the
concept to include the ability to exercise power, scholars have
shown that sovereignty is a heterogenous collection of practices,
concepts, and discourses (Elden, 2006; Krasner, 2001; Kuus, 2002;
McConnell, 2009; Sidaway, 2003). Krasner (2001, p. 21) adds that,
even from a contemporary perspective, sovereignty is a decisively
inconsistent concept, “a basket of goods that do not necessarily go
together.” In fact, he locates four distinct meanings of the term (pp.
19e21): interdependence sovereignty, which “refers to the ability
of states to control movement across their borders”; domestic
sovereignty, which “refers to the authority structures within states
and of the ability of these structures to effectively regulate
behavior”; Vattelian sovereignty, more commonly known as
Westphalian sovereignty, which “refers to the exclusion of external
sources of authority”2; and international legal sovereignty, which
“refers to mutual recognition.” While not his intention, Krasner’s
distinctions help us see that sovereignty in practice is comprised of
different and not always consistent powers with different targets,
ranging from excluding foreign inﬂuence to maintaining internal
order. Hence, building from Krasner’s distinctions, articulated
sovereignty understands sovereignty not merely as a heterogenous
set of powers to make and enforce decisions. It also recognizes that
these powers have different targets and spatialities and are not
necessarily reducible to or consistent with one another.
But in what sense is sovereignty articulated? To grasp this, it is
useful to disaggregate sovereignty from the closely related con-
cepts of state and territory. While scholars have tended to assume
that sovereignty is necessarily territorial and exercised by central
state authorities (Agnew,1994, 2005; Biersteker, 2002), others have
questioned the seemingly necessary sovereignty-state-territory
relation. McConnell (2009), for instance, insightfully shows that
the exiled Tibetan state exercises forms of sovereignty that are not
territorial in any straightforward sense, with Jones (2009) exam-
ining sovereignty in extra-territorial political enclaves along the
IndiaeBangladesh border. Agnew (2005) and Appadurai (1996), in
addition, suggest that sovereignty functions in a networked
fashion, disrupting the idea it only works across tightly boundterritories. Ong (2000), moreover, develops the concept of gradu-
ated sovereignty to make sense of instances where state in-
stitutions temporarily cede power to foreign corporations within
special economic zones. Her work highlights both the ways in
which non-state actors exercise sovereignty and how power re-
lations produce differentiated types of territorydsub-territor-
iesddeﬁned by different modes of control. Together, these analyses
offer important insights into non-straightforwardly-territorial and
non- or ambiguously-state-based forms of sovereignty.
This unhinging of sovereignty from the state and territory pro-
vides important grounding for articulated sovereignty. Working
from the premise that sovereignty is a set of competencies or
powers, what enables or hinders these is a larger arrangement of
negotiations and interactions among various actors: intra-state,
extra-state, and non-state. Sovereignty as a set of powers or abili-
ties is, simply put, articulated through these interactions. Hence
actually-existing sovereignty does not pre-exist this extra-
territorial network of interactions and connections (Bayart, 2000;
Biersteker, 2002; Sidaway, 2003). It is created through them. Arti-
culated sovereignty thus gives both a better understanding of how
effective sovereignty functions and how and where it is constituted
in the ﬁrst place, a constitution that takes us beyond the state.
Building from here, articulated sovereignty lays bare other impor-
tant features of sovereignty. First, all sovereignty is contingent on
how these actors, their interests, and larger sets of laws, discourses,
etc. come together (c.f., Elden, 2006).3 Second, because these ne-
gotiations are ongoing, sovereignty is never a complete project and
must be constantly negotiated and reconsolidated through these
negotiations; sovereignty is, in short, an articulation-in-motion.
Third, not all actors in these negotiations are equal, and hence
sovereignty negotiations are shot through with power disparities.
These inequities along with the fact that actors do not come with
identical interests means that the powers that get articulated are
not necessarily reducible to or consistent with one another. More
than this though, as the case of the LNP/GLTP illustrates, these
powers can be gained by negotiating or even compromising other
powers with the different actors. So while we may clump these
powers together as “sovereignty,” this only gives the aura of sin-
gularity and internal consistency.
The case of the LNP/GLTP, however, seems somewhat at odds
with these investigations working to disaggregate sovereignty from
state and territory. Simply put, I want to relocate sovereignty in the
Mozambican state and in a given (semi)bounded, sub-national
territory: a (trans)national park. Again, by understanding sover-
eignty as a set of powers articulated through interactions among
various actors located within and beyond the state, I show how
these interactions actually produce a new state in the realm of
conservation, that is, a greatly empowered Mozambican state and
one nearly unrecognizable from its predecessor left shattered by
the war. In addition, these extra-territorial interactions produce
new types of territory, in this case a (trans)national park. Hence,
while I ultimately relocate sovereignty in the Mozambican state
and over national territory, I draw into question the sovereignty-
state-territory triad by showing how all three elements are artic-
ulated in part through extra-territorial interactions.
Sovereignty and the LNP/GLTP
Background to the LNP and GLTP
While the idea of creating a transnational conservation area in
south-eastern Africa emerged in the 1920s, it was not until the
1990s that the idea regained traction. In 1990 a South African
delegation began discussing with Mozambican President Joaquim
Chissano the possibility of linking Kruger National Park to
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reserve) and later Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou National Park. Growing
out of these meetings, a working group submitted a proposal to the
Global Environmental Facility (GEF), afﬁliated with theWorld Bank,
to further study the feasibility of the project. The ﬁnal report
determined that conservation should indeed be a high priority for
Mozambique especially given the ecological destruction of the war.
The project was further assisted by the end of the war in 1992,
followed shortly by the fall of Apartheid in South Africa and the
semi-privatization of land in Mozambique, seen as essential to
attracting private investment (Lunstrum, 2008; World Bank, 1996,
2006). After further negotiations, in 2001 the Mozambican gov-
ernment gazetted Coutada 16 into the Limpopo National Park
(LNP), which was soon followed by the inauguration of the Great
Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP). Transfrontier Conservation
Areas (TFCAs) across sub-Saharan Africa, of which the GLTP is the
ﬂagship project, have garnered signiﬁcant support given that they
promise to secure multiple goals simultaneously. These range from
large-scale conservation and economic development, including
community-based development and opportunities for private in-
vestors, to the promotion of cooperation and peaceful relations
between member countries (Peace Parks Foundation, 2012a;
Ramutsindela, 2007; Wolmer, 2003).
TFCAs, the GLTP, and threats to state sovereignty
While still a young body of scholarship, a central concern
permeating the TFCA literature is how these projects reorganize
power relations at various scalesdfrom the community, to the
state, to the transnational realmdand with what impact. In this
respect, a tension has emerged, with some critics suggesting these
projects violate or otherwise threaten sovereignty of the member
states, and others arguing the seeming opposite: that they shore up
state power. Building from both perspectives and the concept of
articulated sovereignty, I show that it is precisely through many of
the partnerships that are thought to threaten state power that the
Mozambican state has been able to extend its control over the LNP
and, more broadly, reinvent itself and territory, i.e., a national park.
One of themost acute anxieties underlying the creation of TFCAs
is that they have the potential to impinge upon national autonomy,
leaving some countries reluctant to sign on to such projects (van
Amerom, 2002; Duffy, 1997; van der Linde, Oglethorpe, Sandwith,
Snelson, & Tessema, 2001). In fact, such fears shaped project ne-
gotiations as far back as the 1920s, with apprehensions resurfacing
in the 1990s (Interviewwith former GLTP ofﬁcial, 2012; Duffy,1997;
Mavhunga & Spierenburg, 2009; Spierenburg, Steenkamp, & Wels,
2008). As a result, the 2002 treaty establishing the GLTP is reso-
lute that the signatories “recogniz[e] the principle of sovereign
equality and territorial integrity of their states” (Preamble) and that
the “sovereign rights of each [state] shall be respected, and no
[state] shall impose decisions on another” (Article 5, x1).
Despite such guarantees, critics point out that TFCAs like the
GLTP have the potential to threaten national sovereigntydpartic-
ularly the state’s ability to make its own decisions over its national
territorydthrough several practices. These range from the need to
cede a certain degree of decision-making capacity to a supra-
national decision-making body (such as the GLTP’s Joint Manage-
ment Board) and harmonize laws and policies at the supra-national
level, to more general negotiations with other member states and
project funders. In terms of the latter, the LNP/GLTP has been
funded almost entirely by international donors, including the
German Development Bank (KfW), French Development Agency
(AFD), and World Bank. Reﬂecting broader concerns over the
impact of international donors on state power, the worry is that
donor assistance inevitably comes with strings attached orconditionalities that impinge upon the decision-making capacity of
the national government. Indeed, this is a concern voiced by
scholars and Mozambican conservation ofﬁcials alike (van
Amerom, 2002; van Amerom & Büscher, 2005; Duffy, 2006; In-
terviews, 2004, 2005) and is reﬂective of a deeper unease that
sovereignty has lost much of its meaning for a profoundly aid-
dependent country like Mozambique (Batley, 2005; Plank, 1993).
In the context of TFCAs in southern Africa, there is an even
greater concern regarding South Africa’s presumed dominance, in
terms of both state ofﬁces and NGOs, especially the highly-
inﬂuential Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) (van Amerom & Büscher,
2005; Ramutsindela, 2007; Wolmer, 2003). Several critics have
argued that such domination translates into a threat to the sover-
eignty of other member states, suggesting a “partnership” of un-
equals. van Amerom (2002), for instance, is explicit that South
African dominance is likely to compromise the GLTP treaty provi-
sion that “no [state] shall impose decisions on another.” More
concretely and arguably the most compelling and well-cited
example, critics point to how the South African Department of
Environment and Tourism (DEAT) backed by the PPF (and German
funders) essentially forcedMozambique to accept a quite restrictive
transfrontier park and, related, demanded communities be relo-
cated outside the LNP. This is despite the fact that GLTP member
countries initially agreed to create a multi-use conservation area
that would allow human habitation and the sustainable use of re-
sources (van Amerom & Büscher, 2005; Büscher & Schoon, 2009;
Interview with LNP funder, 2012; RRP-UW, 2002; Spierenburg
et al., 2008). In addition, critics point to the fact that the PPF,
through its links with DEAT, forced the Mozambican government to
open the LNP before the country was ready, essentially interfering
with its ability to decide what would happen within the park and
when (Groenewald, 2002; RRP-UW, 2002). Duffy (2006) offers the
most well-developed of these arguments. Charting more general
trends in how NGOs are transforming power relations through
transfrontier conservation negotiations, she argues that NGOs like
the PPF “are part of a process of shifting responsibility for conser-
vation out of state hands and into the hands of non-state entities
and complex, non-territorial networks of governance” (p. 96;
emphasis added). Taken together, these investigations leave us
with an understanding of (Mozambican) state power left threat-
ened or eroded by foreign “partners.”
Such critiques raise the question of what exactly is understood
to be producing this reorganization of authority that threatens or
displaces state power. Some critics locate the answer partially in
the rise of multi-national governing bodies and the dominance of
the South African state as we saw above. Amore substantial answer
rests in a larger shift toward neoliberal conservation in which non-
state actorsdespecially NGOs, international ﬁnancial organiza-
tions, and private interestsdhave proliferated and taken on roles
once held more centrally by state actors (see especially van
Amerom, 2002; van Amerom & Büscher, 2005; Duffy, 2006; also
see Büscher, 2010; Igoe & Brockington, 2007; Ramutsindela, 2007;
Wolmer, 2003). None of these critics, however, suggest that state
power is fully extinguished through this expansion of non-state
actors.
TFCAs, the GLTP, and the consolidation of state sovereignty
Seemingly at odds with suggestions that TFCAs threaten or
erode state sovereignty, other perspectives emerging especially in
the early TFCA literature contend that these initiatives extend and
ﬁrm up state power. Although unable to offer much concrete evi-
dence, their analyses are nonetheless provocative. Focusing on
TFCAs in southern Africa and Central America, Duffy (2001, p. 2)
argues that even though in theory these projects may shift power
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areas that had previously been beyond the reach of law enforce-
ment and other government agencies” and hence amount to acts of
transboundary state-making (also see Wolmer, 2003). Duffy fore-
sees this translating into the foreclosure of unsanctioned activities
located at the international border, especially smuggling, poaching,
and undocumented migration. van Amerom (2002, p. 266) comes
to a similar conclusion, contending that African states may “increase
their sovereignty” through these projects. While providing little
detail, she proposes that this can happen through increased state
policing as well as the development of infrastructure, which can
facilitate state access.
These contributions reﬂect a larger scholarly concern with how
environmental projects, including conservation projects, consoli-
date state power and amount to acts of state-making more
broadly. For instance, scholars show how states discursively
construct “vacant” or “ecologically sensitive” lands, claim owner-
ship of them, delimit and declare “protected areas,” physically
reinvent them, and move in to control natural resources and
populations within their borders. We see such practices unfolding
in sites as diverse as forests, wildlife parks, urban parks, and
even community-based natural resource projects where state
power has presumably been devolved to the community level
(Neumann, 1998, 2004; Rademacher, 2008; Schafer & Bell, 2002;
Sivaramakrishnan, 1999; Vandergeest & Peluso, 1995). This vision
of enhanced state power in the TFCA and critical conservation-
environment literature stands in tension with observations
above that TFCAs threaten state sovereignty. In fact, this friction is
found in the work of Duffy (2001, 2006) and van Amerom (2002)
who both argue at different times that these projects may
strengthen and threaten state power, yet who leave the underlying
tension largely unexamined. Building on the concept of articulated
sovereignty and my own empirical research, I use this tension as a
springboard to show that the Mozambican state is able to extend
its power over the space of the LNP/GLTP precisely through
many of the partnerships with foreign actors that in other respects
seem to threaten its power. In short, I show how state sovereignty
is built in and through the LNP/GLTP and examine the
complexities and impacts of the underlying and unequal sover-
eignty negotiations.
Extending state power within and through the LNP/GLTP
To understand the extension of Mozambican state power
through the LNP/GLTP, we must ﬁrst turn back to the early assis-
tance provided by the World Bank through the Global Environ-
mental Facility (GEF). While they determined that transfrontier
conservation should be a high priority, one factor stood as a
momentous obstacle: the profound lack of Mozambican institu-
tional capacity especially at the national level to promote conser-
vation and related development (World Bank, 1992). The reason,
recognized by the Bank, was the war: it had decimated wildlife
populations and destroyed state capacity to rehabilitate their
numbers, let alone promote wildlife-related development. Most
state-led conservation institutions and activities had collapsed,
infrastructure was largely destroyed, and funding had nearly dis-
appeared (Hatton et al., 2001; World Bank, 1992, 1996). In the face
of such profound institutional weakness, in 1996 the World Bank/
GEF helped develop and fund the USD$5 million “Mozambique
Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strength-
ening Project.” As the project’s name suggests, institutional
strengthening, i.e., the strengthening of state capacity at the na-
tional level, was the sine qua non for the development of conser-
vation areaswithinMozambique, transfrontier or otherwise (World
Bank, 1996).Signiﬁcant funding went to the project’s institutional and policy
development component, which enabled the state to engage in
collaborationswith international actors, including donors, andwith
the private sector, NGOs, and communities. This component,
moreover, worked to:
[b]uild the capacity (through training of staff, provision of
technical advisory services and logistical support, including
vehicles, equipment, ofﬁce supplies and refurbishing and study
tours and twining arrangements) of [the] national government
(within the Ministry of Agriculture and later in the newly
created Ministry of Tourism) to fulﬁll its mandate of policy
formulation, planning and technical guidance, and provide
support to provincial and local government (through training,
technical assistance and logistical support) [in three TFCAs
including the GLTP’s precursor of Gazaland-Kruger] (World
Bank, 1996, p. 2).
The project additionally helped identify, delineate, and zone
protected areas including Coutada 16 (the LNP’s precursor), develop
initial management plans, rehabilitate infrastructure including
roads and staff housing, enable community involvement, and
ﬁnally monitor and evaluate the program. Given its success, at a
cost of USD$36.7 million, the Bank instituted Phase II of the project
to further strengthen institutional capacity (Interviews with Min-
istry of Tourism ofﬁcials, 2004e2005, 2008; World Bank, 2004,
2006).
Keeping in mind the extremely limited power of the Mozam-
bican state after the war, this project ultimately helped build a state
capable of designating and making decisions about new land-use
categories including TFCAs. In fact, the money along with assis-
tance from the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) helped create the
Transfrontier Conservation Areas Unit, an inﬂuential state institu-
tion responsible for organizing, promoting, and overseeing these
projects. The Unit is housed within the Mozambican Ministry of
Tourism, which itself emerged only in 2001 partially through these
larger institutional changes. In short, theWorld Bank, seen by some
as threatening the sovereignty of the Mozambican state, has built
national-level state institutions and provided them with various
resourcesdﬁnancial, technical, legal, and infrastructuraldthat
have enabled the extension of state power over existing and po-
tential conservation areas. This, however, is only the beginning of
the story.
Other partners including donors and South African institutions,
again criticized for threatening Mozambican power, have been
working with and indeed strengthening Mozambican state in-
stitutions more locally within the LNP. Their assistance helps
consolidate Mozambican state power over this new territory to
regulate it and, more fundamentally, reinvent it as a (trans)national
park, i.e., a state-owned conservation space. This assistance begins
with the development of a park administration and basic infra-
structure. The LNP Warden is backed by an administration heavily
funded by the PPF, including two PPF-ﬁnanced South African
“technical advisors” who are high-raking ofﬁcials within the
administration.4 This includes the LNP Project Manager who runs
the day-to-day operations of the park and oversees much of its
developments as well as an advisor who is effectively the head of
wildlife and security (Interviews with LNP ofﬁcials, 2009, 2012).
They bring to the LNP expertise in how to create and regulate a
national park and are closely involved with the sovereignty-
extending activities I turn to below.
Key to the transformation of the LNP into a full-ﬂedged national
park is infrastructure development, including roads, fences, and
administrative buildings. Although sponsored initially by theWorld
Bank, these are now largely ﬁnanced by KfW (the German Devel-
opment Bank) whoseV22 million investment, managed by the PPF,
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types of infrastructure should not be underestimated when it
comes to state-making and state-extending. The newly-built
administrative complex at the LNP headquarters now houses se-
nior park administration, teams in charge of community develop-
ment, community relocation, buffer zone development, and
wildlife and security, including rangers and anti-poaching spe-
cialists, all in one central location. This new ofﬁce infrastructure
both symbolically marks the presence of the state and enables state
agents to inhabit the park and engage in the everyday decision-
making, development, and maintenance of the park. In a very
material sense, it allows for the consolidation of state power
through the day-to-day micro- and macro-activities that turn the
space into a (trans)national park.
The development of a road network within the LNP equally fa-
cilitates the extension of state power, reﬂecting a broader pattern in
which roads are used as a means of state-making (Kezer, 2009). The
location of roads in the LNP largely reﬂects tourist desires, namely
desires for wildlife viewing, embodied in an expanding network of
4 4 roads, and desires for cross-border mobility, embodied in the
new Giriyondo Road linking the LNP with Kruger (Fig. 2). This
expansion, however, also facilitates the circulation of park staff,
ranging from wildlife specialists and administrators to park
rangers. It enables them to build new infrastructure, hence further
transforming the space into a national park, and to engage in
routine surveillance and regulation of both people and wildlife
deeper into the park. Such infrastructure allows for the extension of
state power in a more subtle manner as well. The LNP adminis-
tration is currently developing a new 4 4 camp in a remote pan,
despite the objection of several ecologists who see this as an
important location for wildlife. A senior LNP ofﬁcial explained that
not only is this what makes the space a prime location for tourists,
but also that the presence of tourists will keep bush meat poachers
away (Interview, 2012). Hence, the location of infrastructure, in this
case a camp and the road leading to it, has the added beneﬁt of
increasing state surveillance and policing by enrolling the (un-
knowing) assistance of tourists.Fig. 2. The Giriyondo Road, which links the LNP to Kruger. The fences (made from branche
farms. Once relocation is complete, the farms will become prime grazing land and habitatThemost explicit evidence of the extension of state power in the
LNP rests in the newly-instituted ranger force. Funding from KfW
and AFD has enabled the recruiting, hiring, training, and housing of
rangers, and provided them with protective uniforms and gear.
Formed, trained, and clothed via donor support, the responsibility
for paying the rangers has now been transferred to the state, which
also provides them with high-caliber ﬁrearms, mainly AK-47s, to
use on patrol. Currently the park has 110 rangersdcompared to
none in the days of the coutada during the wardof whom 45 are
guards and 55 ﬁeld rangers. The latter move through the park to
enforce rules and monitor the park’s recently reintroduced wildlife
(Interview with LNP ofﬁcials and rangers, 2012; Peace Parks
Foundation, 2012b).
Partially reﬂecting Duffy’s (2001) prediction, LNP rangers spend
signiﬁcant time on anti-poaching patrols. These are related to bush
meat trade and subsistence poaching but especially to rhino
poaching due to unprecedented demand for rhino horn in Asia.
While the actual killing of rhino takes place in Kruger, which houses
the vast majority of the world’s remaining population, LNP rangers
run anti-poaching patrols in their own park, given that some
poachers reside in communities inside the LNP and many more
move across this space to enter Kruger. Aided by the Environmental
Crime Investigation Unit of South Africa National Parks (SANParks)
based in Kruger, LNP rangers work to prevent poaching-related
activities including ﬁrearm acquisition, harboring and trans-
porting poachers and rhino horn, and liaising with buyers (In-
terviews with LNP and Kruger ofﬁcials and rangers, 2009, 2012).
State power has indeed been extended through the donor-
supported and SANParks-assisted LNP ranger force. It has, for
instance, made arrests tied to poaching, conﬁscated ﬁrearms and
wildlife products, and prevented the unsanctioned use of natural
resources (Interviews with LNP ofﬁcials, rangers, and residents,
2004e2005, 2008, 2012). Success rates have recently dramatically
improved due to an incentive scheme implemented in 2011 and
funded by the Wildlife and Environment Society of South Africa
(WESSA) that gives rangers cash incentives for arrests tied to
poaching and the seizing of ﬁrearms and ammunition (Interviews) along the roadside have been built by communities to demarcate and protect their
for wildlife. Photo by the author, 2012.
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without consequence, especially for many people living inside the
park. Residents, like Vicente as we saw above, have voiced concern
that they have been abused by rangers, sometimes for seemingly
minor infractions. Although acts of violence at the hands of LNP
rangers have subsided, they have not disappeared: one man was
recently beaten by park rangers for his continued involvement in
killing lions and leopards for their skins, while another suspected
poacher was shot and killed in early 2012 after an exchange of ﬁre
with rangers (Interviews with LNP ofﬁcials, 2012). The ability to
inﬂict violence and ultimately take a life with state protection and
sanction, setting aside the question of justiﬁcation, shows in no
uncertain terms the extension of state power through the park as
well as its impacts (also see Neumann, 2001).
Less severe examples concerning ranger-enforced restrictions
on the use of natural resources also show evidence of the consoli-
dation of state power. Many residents, for instance, have voiced
concern that they face stiff penalties and jail time for killing the
park’s animals, even those that are invading farms or stalking cattle.
Such prohibitions, and the larger consolidation of state power
enabling them, have left some residents uneasy to discuss the
subject. These concerns converge in the words of Noémia:
I am not satisﬁed with the park because the animals eat our
crops. [and] make us suffer. We have no right to speak about
this. A long time ago, we mounted traps to hunt animals. It’s
very dangerous to kill an animal [today]. Even when we take a
small animal, it’s a problem. It’s best we don’t speak of this
subject (Interview, 2008).
Other residents have expressed concern that the government has
consolidated power over and limited access to land needed for
grazing cattle and collecting forest resources, especially wood
needed for cooking and construction (Interviews, 2004e2005,
2008, 2012).
Such examples reﬂect a larger pattern in which conservation
spaces enable an extension of state power over natural resources
(Neumann, 1998, 2004; Schafer & Bell, 2002). The LNP, however,
adds an additional element, showing that policing capabilities in-
side the park are enabled not merely by the state but by the state in
partnership with and empowered by extra-territorial backers.
Without such assistance, this extension of state power would
simply not be possible. I do not, however, want to give the
impression that the extension of state power via a ranger force
amounts to a seamless control over the park. One of the biggest
current interruptions is that rangers on both sides of the border
have been involved in rhino poaching given how lucrative it is
(Interviews with Kruger and LNP ofﬁcials and rangers, 2009, 2012).
The expansion of state power is thus incomplete, yet it is none-
theless an expansion as the examples above convey.
Partnerships with extra-state actors have also enabled the most
contentious aspect of the development of the LNP: relocation.
Financial assistance from KfW is enabling the resettlement of
approximately 7000 people living inwhat is seen as the park’s prime
wildlife habitat. Further assistance comes from AFD, which has pro-
videdV11million todevelop thepark’sbuffer zonewheremostof the
displaced communitieswill be relocated (AFD, 2011; Interviewswith
LNPandAFDofﬁcials, 2012; Salas, 2011). Relocation is justiﬁedon the
grounds that it is too dangerous for communities to live in close
proximity to wildlife, that they interfere with anti-poaching efforts,
that their presence potentially disrupts the “wilderness” feel of the
park, and that, with communities gone, wildlife will further
populate the park. While relocation is technically voluntary, both
communities and scholars have questioned this given threats posed
by an increasingly-dense population of dangerous animals (In-
terviews, 2004e2005, 2008, 2012; Spierenburg & Milgroom, 2008).Resettlement, again funded by international donors, is ﬁrmly
implicated in the expansion of state power. Put simply, with com-
munities gone, it becomes much easier for state ofﬁces and actors
to further transform the LNP into a functioning national park and
stand as the key decision-makers over this space. Resettlement
allows them to act less hindered by residents who often have a
different vision of the purpose of this space, a different sense of to
whom it belongs, and who subsequently obstruct the realization of
the park’s vision, in many ways through their very presence within
the space. These differences and evidence of the consolidation of
state power are expressed by Madalena:
[The park administration came] and said they wanted us out of
here.We refused and saidwe did notwant to go because this is
our country and we know the way of life here. They brought
the elephants and left here and said, “This is a park and it no
longer belongs to Massingir. We will build for you elsewhere”
(Interview, 2008).
Once residents are gone, in fact, the park administration can
complete a ﬁnal installment of the wildlife translocation program
to further increase wildlife numbers, a program itself supported by
SANParks and the PPF (Interviews with LNP, PPF, and Kruger ofﬁ-
cials, 2012). Somewhat ironically, wildlife will be particularly
attracted to spaces communities have already cleared for their
farms, as these will enable prime grazing land as opposed to dense
forested land (Interview with LNP ofﬁcial, 2012) (Fig. 2).
The ways in which relocation enables the extension of state
power have become more obvious in recent years with the upsurge
in rhino poaching. With people still living in the park, it is simply
easier for community members involved in poaching to cross the
border to hunt rhino in Kruger and to escape easily back across the
border into Mozambique. Relocation will ensure they are farther
from Kruger, with the LNP acting essentially as a buffer zone to
Kruger’s rhinos. Furthermore, the sheer number of people living in
the LNP makes it difﬁcult to regulate and monitor human move-
ment, some of which is tied to poaching. Relocation solves this
problem too (Interviews with LNP and Kruger rangers and ofﬁcials,
2012). In short, a space empty of human communitiesdespecially
potentially “unruly” communitiesdtranslates into a space inwhich
the state has much more secure control and one it can further
transform into a (trans)national park.
While relocation does show the extension of state power,
especially as evidenced by the already-relocated community of
Nanguene, it also shows the messiness and precariousness of such
an extension. We see this in two respects. First, in 2009 KfW put a
hold on its funding, which interfered with many of the park’s plans,
including relocation. KfW’s decision was motivated by the fact that
the same land promised to the Ministry of Tourism for relocation
had been given by the Ministry of Agriculture to Procana, a private
(and now-defunct) biofuel project, which placed LNP communities
in limbo. KfW hence insisted they be given a DUAT (Direito de Uso e
Aproveitamento da Terra or Title for the Use and Improvement of
Land), a document that would legally protect their rights and
preclude another Procana-type debacle (Interview with KfW and
LNP ofﬁcials, 2012). This illustrates how precarious state power so
thoroughly dependent upon extra-territorial partners and articu-
lations can be and, more broadly, shows how contingent sover-
eignty is in practicedcontingent on the practices and relationships
that produce it. Nonetheless, with funding now resumed, so too has
the relocation program and the related consolidation of state
power.
Second, relocation has not gone uncontested. While some resi-
dents are more amenable to the idea and see it as a means of
securing better opportunities and even leveling power relations
within the community, others are less convinced, arguing that it
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state.While early onmany residents outright refused to leave, more
recent opposition seems to amount more to “foot dragging” to
delay the process rather than resist it altogether (Interviews with
residents and LNP ofﬁcials, 2004e2005, 2008, 2012). So while the
state via the LNP administration can and very likely will empty the
park’s core of villages, it does not do so entirely on its own terms
and along its own timeline. Hence, the state, even heavily backed by
its various partners, does not have absolute control over the park.
And if we think of sovereignty as a process that is actively built, we
see that this process of articulation is indeed unfolding although
not smoothly.
Examining processes ranging from the development of legal and
technical capacity, park administration and infrastructure, a ranger
force, and community relocation reminds us of not only how
thoroughly constructed sites of “wilderness” like the LNP are but
also that their creation is intricately tied to the extension of state
power. Neumann (2004, p. 203) reinforces both points in his dis-
cussion of Tanzanian game reserves and national parks as “arti-
factual wilderness.” The “wilderness” of these sites, he explains, is
“artifactual in the dual sense that it is wilderness produced not by
nature, but by human hand, and that [it] is an artifact of the state’s
assertion of territorial ownership and control.” The LNP, however,
departs from Neumann’s insightful analysis in two ways. First, as
we saw above, the Mozambican state is only able to engage in these
“wilderness”-producing and state-extending practices to the extent
that it is backed and empowered by foreign or extra-territorial
partners. Second, seemingly unlike the spaces discussed by Neu-
mann, the LNP has never been a viable national park on its own
(Interviews with GLTP ecologist, 2004 and KfW ofﬁcial, 2012). This
suggests that the Mozambican state has been able to extend its
power over and through the LNP, drawing on extra-territorial
partnerships to do so, only to the extent that the park is inte-
grated into a larger transnational conservation space, i.e., only to
the extent that the LNP is more than a national space.
Articulated sovereignty: working through the sovereignty tension of
the LNP/GLTP
The foreign assistance and partnerships that have helped enable
the consolidation of Mozambican state power over the LNP suggest
a tension in which these partnerships simultaneously threaten and
empower the Mozambican state, as illustrated above. Under-
standing sovereignty as articulated can help us resolve this tension
and in the process shed light on the more general functioning of
sovereignty. As developed above, articulated sovereignty un-
derstands sovereignty as a heterogenous set of gained powers and
competencies that allow a state or other body to make and enforce
decisions over certain spaces and the resources and populations
residing therein. These powers emerge from negotiations and in-
teractions with other actors and institutions: state, non-state, and
extra-state alike. Sovereignty, as this set of powers, ﬂows from
these interactions. It is articulated through them.
Furthermore, partially because these negotiations involve mul-
tiple actors with different interests and because the negotiations
rarely if ever unfold on a level playing ﬁeld, the powers that do get
articulated are neither necessarily consistent nor reducible to one
another. Building from Krasner’s distinctions, although his interests
lie elsewhere, helps us grasp that what we see with the LNP/GLTP is
a “sovereignty exchange,” one in which the Mozambican state,
through its various conservation and tourism institutions and
engagement with external actors, is giving up a degree of Vattelian
or Westphalian sovereignty in order to consolidate domestic sov-
ereignty. More explicitly, the state is giving up the right to refuse or
exclude certain sources of authority coming from these externalactors. It is doing so in return for assistance in consolidating its
internal decision-making and decision-enforcing capacity over a
particular space, that is, the LNP, and the communities and natural
resources contained within. By taking apart the concept of sover-
eignty in this way, we can begin to see its complex spatiality: here a
type of internal sovereigntydwithin the nation-state over national
territory and populationsdis gained or articulated by compro-
mising sovereignty externallydthat is, with extra-territorial actors.
This also helps us see that the sovereignty tension of the LNP/GLTP
exists neither merely in transfrontier conservation nor state prac-
tices more broadly. Rather, the tension rests in the concept of
sovereignty itself and in particular in the assumption that it is
internally consistent. Put simply, it is not. Rather, sovereignty
consists of powers and competencies that are not necessarily
reducible to one another and that can be built precisely by
compromising or negotiating other powers, all of which are sub-
sumed under the general rubric of sovereignty.
At the same time, however, we need to be careful not to read this
extension of sovereignty as absolute. Especially as the examples of
rhino poaching and relocation show, the process is messy and
incomplete. In this sense, the Mozambican state certainly does not
have indivisible, absolute controldor de jure sovereigntydover its
territory. Yet in reality absolute control is never possible. What is
possible, and what we see in the LNP/GLTP, is the building of de
facto sovereignty, or the actual ability to exercise power, even
though this extension is uneven and contested (even fromwithin as
with ranger involvement in poaching).
There is a second way of addressing this tension that also draws
on articulated sovereignty but one that is rooted more ﬁrmly in the
historical speciﬁcity of the Mozambican state. If we think of sover-
eignty in purely abstract terms as a state’s unlimited and indivisible
rule over territory and populations, then this does seem to be
violated by extra-territorial actors. Yet if we look at the type and
extent of sovereignty the Mozambican state actually possessed at
the end of thewar and the years leading up to the LNP, we see a very
different dynamic. Due especially to the war but also to a longer
history of colonial underdevelopment, the state at the national,
provincial, district, and village level had little if any substantive
power over large areas of the country, including the area now
locatedwithin the LNP (Lunstrum, 2009). So the statemay have had
de jure sovereignty in terms of being recognized as such by other
states, but it lacked de facto sovereignty. Taking this into account, if
we think of sovereignty as a set of real and gaineddi.e., articu-
lateddpowers, then the Mozambican state in the context of the
LNP/GLTP is not giving up or losing anything it had actually
possessed. Yet it has arguably given up the potential, although never
realized, ability to exclude certain forms of external inﬂuence.
None of this, however, is to imply that concerns over foreign
inﬂuence are not legitimate, especially given the reality of patently
unequal power relations. In fact, even though these state in-
stitutions have been fundamentally strengthened through these
partnerships, the type of powers they have and, importantly, the
constitution of the Mozambican state itself in the realm of con-
servation and the LNP as national territory have been shaped
partially in the image and interests of these foreign partners. To
better grasp this, we need to return to sovereignty in its relation to
state and territory.
Creating states, creating territories, and complicating the
sovereignty-state-territory triad
It is only recently that scholars have turned a critical eye to the
assumption that sovereignty is necessarily state-based and terri-
torial, arguing, for example, that states are not the only entities
exercising sovereignty and that the latter is not necessarily
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points out, part of the reason sovereignty is seen as necessarily
state-based and territorial is that the state is:
treated as a “given.” It is rooted in a grammar of ﬁxed bound-
aries and identities. As a naturalized abstract individual, the
state has acquired a personhood that then underwrites its
special status as the locus of sovereignty.[But i]n fact state-
hood and personhood alike are not the pre-given phenomenon
this story suggests. Rather they are both subjectivities formed
out of social interaction and mutual recognition.
Building from Agnew’s insight, we see with the LNP/GLTP that the
Mozambican state, as a political authority capable of making and
enforcing decisions over this space, has only come into being as
such via interactions with other actors, necessarily including extra-
territorial actors. As we saw above, it is through these negotiations
that the state has been able to develop capacities that enable it to
exercise de facto sovereignty across particular spaces, especially set
against its evisceration during the war. It was only through the
partnerships, as uneven as they may be, with foreign partners that
the state was able to re-build capacity and build a national park, in
the process effectively consolidating its recently-built power over
this newly (re)invented national space. Hence, like the “sovereign
powers” they may come to possess through these interactions,
states as effective decision-makers and decision-enforcers do not
pre-exist these negotiations; they emerge from them. States, like
their sovereignty, are effects of these negotiations. This both re-
inforces Mitchell’s (1999) argument that the state is an effect of the
practices through which it is produced and extends our under-
standing of how conservation spaces amount to acts of state-
making. Neumann (2004, p. 202), in his study of state-making
through conservation, explains that “. proprietary claims [over
conservation areas] and the processes of mapping, bounding,
containing, and controlling nature and citizenry are what make a
state a state. States come into being through these claims and the
assertion of control over territory, resources, and the people.”
Building from here, the sovereignty complexities of the LNP/GLTP
demonstrate that these processes and assertions of control can be
enabled by foreign assistance and partnerships, providing evidence
of extra-territorial state-making through conservation.
One further implication of this extra-territorial web of relations
is that its foreign partners and backers have had a say in what the
Mozambican state, its priorities, and powers have come to be,
underscoring the stark reality of uneven power relations.
Ramutsindela (2007) and Büscher (2010) both convincingly show
that NGOs like the Peace Parks Foundation have worked through
state ofﬁces to attain their goals and that states have been trans-
formed in the process. We can assert this more strongly: the
Mozambican state in the realm of conservation is fundamentally
strengthened and rebuilt in the process and is rebuilt partially in the
reﬂection of these actors and their priorities. This underscores the
impossibility of fully disentangling the state from these external
actors,whatHarrison (2001) refers to in adifferent context as apost-
conditionality regime. While it still makes sense to talk about the
state, we must do so while recognizing that it is not a fully auton-
omous, self-created, self-driven, self-contained entity. Nonetheless,
it is powerful, especially as it has been rebuilt as such. Furthermore,
because the statedin terms of its power and its interestsdchanges
dependingon its alliances, partnerships, backers, and their interests,
what we are left with is a non-essentialist understanding of the
state, of one that is in ﬂux and in a constant state of becoming.
It is not, however, just that the state (re)emerges from these
negotiations, so too does national territory. As we saw earlier,
scholars have effectively challenged understandings of both sov-
ereignty as inherently territorial and territory as merely thecontainer of the state. Building from here, we can begin to see that
territory as national space itself is actively created through the
same extra-territorial processes and partnerships described above.
With the LNP, the Mozambican state is only able to deﬁne, regulate,
and reinvent this space, giving rise to territory as such, through the
transnational partnerships and sovereignty negotiations examined
earlier. In addition, the scholarship on sovereignty often treats
territory as the geographically undifferentiated space of the state or
nation-state. Yet as Ong (2000) reminds us through her analysis of
graduated sovereignty, states and their partners actively produce
different types of territories with particular qualities, in her
example special economic zones, that are deﬁned and regulated by
different actors for diverse ends. With the LNP, the newly-
empowered Mozambican state and its partners have produced a
new type of territory: a (semi)bound and tightly-regulated national
park. Furthermore, this is a space designed for the mobility and
leisure of tourists as opposed to the livelihood activities and
movement of resident communities (see above and Hughes, 2005).
All of these are made possible through extra-territorial partner-
ships. By moving beyond the undifferentiated container model of
territory, we can begin to grasp that territorydor particular terri-
toriesdare effects of these larger sovereignty negotiations between
multiple actors: state, non-state, and extra-state alike. In other
words, articulated sovereignty helps us grasp that it is not only
sovereignty as a set of powers that is articulated through these
external “sovereignty-threatening” negotiations; so too are states
and their varied territories.
Conclusion: articulated sovereignty beyond transfrontier
conservation
Given the paper’s broader interest in how sovereignty functions
in practice, I would like to close by reﬂecting brieﬂy on the utility of
articulated sovereignty beyond transfrontier conservation, looking
at regional integration projects and postcolonial (African) sover-
eignty. What makes the concept particularly useful in both cases is
that they are characterized by sovereignty complexities tied to
extra-territorial actors. Much scholarly debate concerning sover-
eignty in the 1990s was focused on the impacts of regional inte-
gration projects, especially the European Union (EU), on state
power and the functioning of sovereignty more broadly (Anderson,
1996; Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996). More recent contributions
have attempted to grasp further complexities of EU-related sover-
eignty through the development of concepts like shared sover-
eignty, which highlights the ways in which states agree to multi-
level governance to share or pool resources and decision-making
capacity. Such a process opens doors to the foreign inﬂuence of
supra-national institutions and other states but with hopes of
improving domestic control (Mamudu & Studlar, 2009). Articulated
sovereignty works similarly to grasp what is effectively a sover-
eignty exchange but pushes further to underscore the ongoing
presence of power disparities, and even coercion, between the
different actors, something problematically elided in the language
of “sharing.” The concept also extends its purview beyond “ofﬁcial”
actors in multi-level governance, namely states and the supra-
national entities of which they are members, to include actors
such as NGOs, international ﬁnancial institutions, and private
capital/investors that shape decisions behind the scenes.
Moving from Europe to its former colonies, many popular and
scholarly accounts understand African sovereignty in terms of its
lack. This deﬁciency presumably rests in the region’s disconnection
from the world (Bayart, 2000) or from the unyielding intervention
of foreign actors (Plank, 1993) and is routinely showcased in the
seeming proliferation of weak or failed states (Sidaway, 2003). Such
assumptions have not gone uncontested. Bayart (2000) shows that
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suggests, more controversially, that “. sovereignty in Africa is
exercised through the creation and management of dependence”
on foreign actors (p. 228). Following an equally critical trajectory,
Sidaway (2003) shows how the apparent weakness of states like
Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo rests not in their
lack of authority or their disconnection from the West but rather
from a surplus of these types of connections. Much like articulated
sovereignty, both analyses move us beyond the idea that sover-
eignty is a capacity a state clearly possesses or lacks and also
interrupt the idea that foreign connections simply erode state po-
wer, suggesting rather that it can be built through these linkages.
While much aligned with these arguments, articulated sover-
eignty compliments them by, ﬁrst, moving beyond a primary focus
on “weak,” “precarious,” and “conﬂicted” states to analyze the sov-
ereign negotiations underlying the rise of “success stories” like
Mozambique. It can show how states like Mozambique and their
relative (and evennon-democratic) stability, themselves built largely
throughdonor-funded increased capacity, canbearticulated through
these extra-national negotiations. In addition, articulated sover-
eignty highlights the complex spatiality of sovereign articulations. It
does so by drawing explicit attention to ways in which especially
postcolonial states agree to external intervention into domestic
policies and spaces in exchange for the tools to consolidate power
internally. At a more fundamental level, the concept helps illustrate
how national territory or territories emerge from these interactions.
In the case of postcolonial states, these routinely involve extra-
national actors since they provide the means to consolidate control
over space (as well as people) and effect national territory as such.
We see this clearly in thedevelopmentof postcolonial national parks,
heavily funded by international donors, but also in foreign-backed,
postcolonial state development projects like large dams, large-
scale transportation infrastructure, and state-led oil, gas, mining,
and agricultural projects, all of which not only transform space but
produce national territory. In short, as with the LNP/GLTP, even as
states allow foreign inﬂuence, they have been able to tap these re-
sources to help consolidate power, often reinvent themselves, and in
the process bring national territory into being.
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Endnotes
1 This paper draws on research conducted in 2004e2005, 2008, 2009, and 2012 in
Mozambique and South Africa. Five research assistants/translators and I conducted
approximately 175 interviews with residents in two villages in Mozambique’s
Massingir District, with a smaller number of interviews conducted in two addi-
tional villages and the district seat of Tihovene. While initial interviews were set up
with the help of village-level leaders, we recruited most informants by approaching
them directly in public spaces and in their yards or farms, explaining the study, and
inquiring whether they would be interested in participating. We attempted to
ensure wide representation by interviewing a mix of women and men, younger and
older residents, recent migrants and long-term residents including village-level
leaders, wealthier and poorer families, and residents working in various sectors
including agriculture, construction, mining, conservation, and tourism. In addition,
we conducted 56 interviews with ofﬁcials/administrators at the LNP/DNAC/
Mozambican Ministry of Tourism and Kruger/SANParks; LNP and Kruger park
rangers; funders including the Peace Parks Foundation, AFD, KfW, and the German
Embassy; private business interests; and GLTP/LNP project consultants. In addition,we engaged in detailed participant observation of park planning and policy-related
meetings and the daily tasks of LNP staff and Kruger rangers, which also allowed for
sustained informal discussion. Interviews were conducted in Shangaan, Portuguese,
and English. To protect anonymity and encourage participants to speak freely, re-
spondents’ names have been withheld or changed to pseudonyms.
2 Krasner (2001) refers to the principle that states should not intervene in the
domestic affairs of other states as “Vattelian sovereignty,” rather than the more
commonly used “Westphalian sovereignty,” to reinforce that this principle was
introduced not at the 1648 Peace of Westphalia but a century later.
3Differing from my assertion that all sovereignty is contingent, Elden (2006) crit-
ically analyzes the concept of “contingent sovereignty” pushed by the Bush
Administration after 9e11, which speciﬁes that under certain conditions, such as
when a country is harboring terrorists, the norms of sovereignty no longer hold.
4 As explained by an LNP administrator, the ofﬁcial title of “technical advisor” de-
rives from the fact that a foreigner cannot ofﬁcially hold a high-ranking manage-
ment position, drawing attention to a further sovereignty tension within the park
(Interview, 2012).
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